#31 Ken Adamo (EASE Logistics) on Why You Can't Price Like a Coward

The short version

Ken Adamo spent seven years at DAT Freight & Analytics talking to brokers about the freight market. As Chief Strategy Officer at EASE Logistics, he now lives with the calls he used to make from the stage. His read on this cycle is that it's supply-driven rather than demand-driven: capacity is measured in hours and miles, an 8-10% loss from that pool moves rates a lot, and without a demand surge to flatten seasonality the market swings with the calendar. The Fourth of July showed it. The Friday before was frantic, and the Monday after had trucks everywhere and no loads.

That Monday sits at the center of the episode. EASE's spot conversion fell more than 50%, its margin went up, and its pricing model drifted into overshooting the market. Ken's team kept adjusting through the week while, as he sees it, a lot of brokers made one change and stopped. EASE then broke its spot records seven days in a row, and on one tranche of bot quotes it won one in four while still hitting its margin target.

His rule for getting there is that you can't price like a coward, though you can't be stubborn either. Loads bunch between zero and about $2 a mile with a long tail out to $7 or $8, so he starts low and works up; starting high can mean days of losing before you find the market. A lost quote teaches you little because brokers don't know their cost when they sell, while a win tells you exactly what the load cost to buy. Rate tools get a broker into the zone, but in a business that keeps 3-5% of what it grosses, the zone is too wide to stop there.

Ken also takes a position plenty of brokers push back on: algorithmic pricing and strong customer relationships can coexist at scale. At a lot of brokerages, he says, bots convert three to four times better than human reps, because people are good at avoiding losing loads and bad at capturing upside. He still wants operators in the loop. One request to take 5% off the model took a Midwest commodity shipper from one win in 15 to six, and EASE built that into the model. A test that priced sub-10,000-pound loads lower worked across most of the country, then cost them on reefers until they rolled it back.

On regulation, Ken expects the Montgomery decision to push brokers toward a 12-month authority standard, which squeezes small and new carriers in an industry that turns over 80-120% a year. He thinks big asset carriers with brokerage arms come out ahead because they already carry the insurance and the compliance record, and that Delilah's Law could test what counts as offshore dispatch.

Key takeaways

  • A supply-driven cycle moves faster than a demand-driven one. Ken measures capacity in hours and miles, not trucks, and says an 8-10% shift in that pool has an outsized effect on rates. Without a demand surge to flatten seasonality, the market swings with the calendar, which is why the week of the Fourth of July went from no trucks to no loads.
  • Start low and work up. Load prices bunch between zero and about $2 a mile, with a long tail out to $7 or $8. A broker who starts high can lose for hours, days or months before finding the market, while one who starts low takes a few losers early and then knows where the price is.
  • A yes teaches you more than a no. Brokers don't know their cost when they sell. A lost quote never tells you what the load would have cost, while a win shows both what the shipper paid and what the truck cost, so Ken would rather shade slightly low and adjust up.
  • Rate tools get you into the zone, not onto the number. DAT, Truckstop and Sonar narrow the range, but brokers keep roughly 3-5% of gross and the zone those tools give is usually wider than that. Ken benchmarks EASE against DAT's weekly buy report and models details like an 11 AM same-day pickup pricing differently from a 3 PM one.
  • Bots convert better because humans fear losers. At a lot of brokerages, Ken says, bots convert three to four times better than human reps. People avoid risk on the low side and miss opportunity on the high side, which leaves margin dollars on the table.
  • Keep operators in the loop and keep experimenting. An account manager's request to take 5% off the model lifted a Midwest commodity shipper from one win in 15 to six while staying within profit thresholds. A test pricing light loads lower worked nationally but failed on reefers, and EASE rolled it back after a couple dozen loads.

Chapters

TimeTopic
00:00Intro: talking about the market for seven years, then living it
01:10Demand-driven vs. supply-driven freight cycles
02:51How freight reaches brokers through the routing guide
04:15A fragmented market: data centers and flatbed vs. retail
07:09The freight calendar and what Costco's shelves tell you
09:47Capacity measured in hours and miles
13:07Delilah's Law and offshore dispatch
15:34Montgomery and the squeeze on small carriers
19:57Why big carriers with brokerage arms win
23:50What Ken learned after leaving DAT
26:00The gaps you only see from inside a brokerage
28:17Conversion, margin and pricing accuracy
30:56"You can't price like a coward"
34:17Model accuracy and benchmarking against DAT
37:46Sales, ops and pricing, and managing to gross margin dollars
40:08Algorithmic pricing vs. hand quoting
43:02Bots vs. humans
45:06Humans in the loop and pricing experiments
48:55Pricing lessons from Uber
50:38Shipments per employee per day
55:20Can boutique brokers compete?
57:00What's next for Ken and EASE

Notable quotes

"You can't price like a coward in this industry. It takes a level of conviction in what you're doing. It takes a level of belief in your operations team to go make it so."

Ken Adamo, Chief Strategy Officer, EASE Logistics

"A no signal is so much less rich than a yes signal. Because I never know what it would have cost to move that load when I get a no."

Ken Adamo, Chief Strategy Officer, EASE Logistics

"The ninth load that day is gonna price a lot different than the first. But if you run DAT RateView or Sonar or anything, it's gonna give you the same answer all ten times."

Ken Adamo, Chief Strategy Officer, EASE Logistics

"As humans we're really good at risk conversion on the low side. We're really bad at opportunity capture on the high side."

Ken Adamo, Chief Strategy Officer, EASE Logistics

"There is no better position to be in as a broker than an incumbent at an RFP. And there's probably no worse position to be as a non-incumbent at an RFP."

Ken Adamo, Chief Strategy Officer, EASE Logistics

Full transcript

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Auto-transcribed via Deepgram nova-3. Speaker labels are approximate; light cleanup applied.

[00:01] Jesse: All right, welcome to another episode of The Freight Show. Ken, it's great to have you on. I'm excited for this conversation.

[00:08] Ken: Great to be here. Thanks for having me.

[00:10] Jesse: Ken, you are, in many ways, a student of the markets in freight and have a real pulse on the state of things, as best as anyone can. I'm curious to get your perspective on what you're seeing out there right now. Things are changing very quickly, and I'm always eager to hear from folks like yourself, especially now that you're on the operating front lines, what you're seeing and what your assessment of the state of affairs is.

[00:42] Ken: Yeah, I think I'm in a unique position, right? Because I got to talk about it for seven years, especially the last three or four months before I left, and then I had to go live it and see how correct or incorrect I was. And as is typical, you're right about a lot of things, you're wrong about a lot of things. I remember the setup for this was the fear that it would be a supply-driven cycle recovery. If you think back a couple cycles, before ELDs, something like that, the hallmark of those cycles is that demand is a much, much more powerful lever in freight. If you think about COVID, when everyone was buying things because they couldn't go out to eat and do all that. The buying lever, the demand lever. If you think about fracking when that started, that tends to hammer out seasonality. You could see markets completely blow through your typical seasonal summer slowdown or the winter slowdown. If you remember the Omicron variant, I think it was in 2021, it turned February around. We had a busy February and no one could imagine something like that. So those are all demand-driven type things. When you have a supply-driven market, and when we say supply we mean trucks, things tend to ebb and flow much faster. So the Fourth of July, the week before, it fell on a Saturday this year, was nuts. Everyone's hair was on fire, couldn't find trucks. Came in that Monday, it's like trucks everywhere, no loads. And it's been pretty much slow since. I think all the major data reporting services have been reporting a pretty steady down cycle since the Fourth. I think most of it's seasonal though, probably ninety percent seasonal.

[02:23] Jesse: Yeah, that's interesting. And I guess it makes sense, but why is the demand factor so much more important? Is it just that you've got somebody that needs product to move, presumably because it's worth a lot to them, and therefore they're willing to pay a lot more to move that freight? Is that the dynamic for why the demand side's more important?

[02:51] Ken: It's part of it, right? I think it's more important for us in the spot market and brokerages further down the routing guide, because freight gets to us when there's not enough trucks in a pretty sequential way. It's probably the easiest thing to understand for a new freight person: your number one option failed, your number two option failed, your number three. I teach new hires about it. It's like you're going out to dinner, you don't have a reservation, and the first three places you tried were all booked up. So you're eating at maybe your third or fourth choice that night. When demand goes off the rails, it's bursting at the seams. It's new lanes that the shipper might not ship. It's incremental shipments over and above what they previously shipped. During COVID it was alternate SKUs. What you saw was a reduction in SKU count but an increased depth in those SKUs, because they were going to stock whatever they could get. So that's net new opportunity. It's not purely getting to you as a function of not enough capacity at the headwaters of the routing guide. So demand is also more prevalent. A lot of the cyclicality we see in freight is either a function of supply or demand. We know it gets busier in the spring, it gets slower in the winter, there's less things to ship. But there's also seasonal patterns of when trucks are in and out of service and when new capacity hits the road. So when it's strictly on the supply side, trucks came back after the Fourth. A lot of them took a nice couple of weeks off heading into the Fourth, you had Roadcheck week as another mileage marker there, and then they flooded back. Relative to a similar amount of demand, you tend to see rates come down. I will say though, this market is very fragmented. I was chatting with Craig Fuller about this this week. You couldn't say the same thing about data centers. There's an immense amount of demand right now for data center construction. So if that's your bag, if you're a carrier or broker in the heavy industrial or data center or energy space, especially if you're in fracking on a flatbed, you're doing really, really well, and this is all a moot point. But if you're shipping a lot of retail freight, demand is low and capacity's still a little bit tight. That's how you think about it. Walmart missed earnings tremendously this morning, so you're starting to hear a lot of canary in the coal mine around that narrative.

[05:03] Jesse: Interesting. What do you think is happening on the demand side for retail categories? Have you looked into the state of the economy? Because it does feel like we're in two worlds, where anything touching the data center build-out is ripping, but things are pretty tepid in some other parts of the economy.

[05:25] Ken: Yeah, I think it's weak. And again, I think it's very segmented. If you look at bev-al, beverage alcohol, a lot of younger people aren't drinking anymore. Bev-al is a huge segment. There are even mid-sized brokers who strictly focus on retail, non-perishable, produce, shelf stable and bev-al, and that's a huge segment of the economy. I think it's an interesting story to say that's all peptides. I'm sure that has something to do with it, but I think legal cannabis, a change in lifestyle, people not having as many kids, all of this is going into the consumption of perishables being down. And with retail, I think there's a lot of negative sentiment around consumer health. When gasoline is four fifty a gallon at the pump, interest rates haven't come down, maybe you're bursting at the seams, you went from a family of one to a family of two, you're in a small one or two bedroom apartment and you can't really move because you're locked into a low interest rate and housing prices are still high. Those are all things that very pervasively affect your decisions when you go to a grocery store or a retail clothing store. I would not be shocked if back-to-school spending was down a bit this year. It might be up sequentially, because everything always goes up and to the right, but you have to look at it on a comp basis, and I wouldn't be surprised if it's pretty poor.

[06:55] Jesse: Yeah, that's interesting. If you think about it throughout the year, what are the seasonal flows that you typically see?

[07:09] Ken: So again, the huge caveat is it depends. If you're in flatbed, it's completely different. If you're specialized, it's different. Over the last fifteen years, with e-comm, we've essentially pushed retail peak halfway into January. It's the returns, it's everything getting back, it's licking your wounds. So mid-January to early March is very, very slow. It's just the way it is. Then everyone talks about produce season, even if you're not hauling produce. So you have that chunk of produce season in the spring, and it's not just produce. It's new patio furniture, it's grills. You can learn a lot about freight from Costco, because Costco doesn't change their shelving all that often. They tend to do it in chunks, and you can learn a lot about freight if you peg it off of that. When Costco's putting out the furniture, the beds and living rooms, that tends to be slow for freight. When Costco starts putting out the camping and the Weber grills, freight's about to pick up. That all tends to build until the Fourth, and then you tend to see this cliff. Then you get into the dog days of summer until Labor Day. Labor Day's late this year. We have a whole extra bonus week, which will be next week, because it's as late as it can be on the calendar. Then it starts to build, you get your October, November, December peak, and then it all starts again. That's the freight calendar, as I would generally explain it to someone.

[08:32] Jesse: Yeah. With a DOT blitz week somewhere in there as well.

[08:38] Ken: Yeah, the big one is in the spring. We've got one coming up next week, which I think will be a bit of a non-issue. And then hurricanes. Those are the blips. It doesn't mean they can't catalyze things. If you go back to 2017, ELDs and the Trump tax cuts, that was catalyzed by Hurricanes Harvey and Irma that really whacked Houston and Florida and kicked things off. So, sans tropical weather, we've been having some crazy weather in the Midwest and upper Midwest, so that's made those markets tighter than usual. Some flooding and some downed trees, and Indiana got whacked pretty hard. So you have those minor disruptions, but those are all bumps on the overall curve that happens throughout the year.

[09:20] Jesse: Yeah, that's really interesting. And what is your perspective on the state of supply right now? What is the data telling us, and what is your sense for what has happened? Clearly a bunch of capacity has exited the market, it seems. What is the state of affairs there?

[09:47] Ken: I think context is important. An eight to ten percent shift in the capacity pool has monumental effects on rates. And capacity isn't just people. It certainly isn't just trucking companies. If you break it down to its basic essence, capacity is measured by hours and miles. I bring that up because ELDs were the last major capacity crunch that we can point to that was similar to this, and it didn't necessarily pull a bunch of people out of the market. It took hours out. So if you think about it in the sense that we lost maybe eight to ten percent of hours that we slowly gained back over time, both legally and illegally, that had a massive multi-year impact on the freight markets. I think that's what you're seeing here. I don't know how to exactly rank it. I don't think English language proficiency has had a big impact. I think there's enough data out there now where you'd say it's probably less than one percent, maybe two percent of drivers can't speak English to a level that would pass an English proficiency test. I think non-domiciled would have a bigger impact. I think some of the state registration and crackdowns on illegal truck driving schools. The totality of all of that has probably put it somewhere north or south of ten percent, but enough to have a significant impact on latent capacity in the market. We were already at a low. If you think about the COVID cycle, anyone who was in this market in late 2019, very early 2020 could tell you times were really, really bad. The market was in extremely poor shape. There were truckers at the White House. A lot of these recoveries, the sharpness of them is a function of how deep the down cycle was before it. So I think it's absolutely had an impact on capacity. But if you're calling balls and strikes, if you're not just a LinkedIn or Twitter advocate, this whole thing will be settled by the capacity that comes back to fill the need. Because we're short capacity now. It's evident in the rates. And are those all going to be natural born citizen truck drivers of pristine quality that come back in to fill that gap? We'll see. I don't think it will be. I've been pretty critical. I think a lot of this is well intentioned on the face of it, but a lot of empty calories. I forget the numbers, I used to be able to quote them off by heart, but we're talking orders of magnitude more people die from drunk truck drivers than from people who can't speak English. But the news story of a foreign truck driver going left of center in Florida and taking out a family serves a purpose. It's incredibly tragic. I would argue it's no less tragic than any other reason. Even if it was an honest mistake, it's still loss of life. But if the FMCSA wanted to really ramp up, we'd add more enforcement, CVSA would ramp up enforcement, et cetera. So I think it's a mixed bag. It will be fickle too, because a lot of this hasn't been codified into law. I think Delilah's Law will be a big watermark for whether Congress has the desire to actually codify this into legislation, versus regulatory things that could be changed as soon as the next administration comes into office.

[13:25] Jesse: What exactly is going to be codified with Delilah's Law if it gets through?

[13:31] Ken: It's pretty wide reaching. It speaks to a couple of things. It codifies the necessity to have English language proficiency testing as part of issuance, which is what a lot of these groups, I would argue rightfully so, want to put in. It is kind of a bizarre thing to catch this at enforcement. I understand things will slip through the cracks. I'm not advocating that you shouldn't be testing roadside for English language proficiency. But you took your driver's test, I took my driver's test. You don't give someone a driver's license and say, okay, now I hope you'll follow all the rules, and if you don't, we'll catch you out there. Take out the bad actors who are printing CDLs for a second. You have almost a hundred percent coverage at time of issuance, and probably less than ten percent of drivers, I believe, are stopped roadside in a given year. Probably far less, if I had to guess. So I think what they want to do is shove some of this to time of issuance and try to remedy it that way. There are some non-domiciled components. And there are some really interesting components for brokers to think about, because it seeks to prohibit offshore dispatch, and it's very vaguely written what that means. Your principal place of business can't be overseas. And as we all know, there are a lot of dispatch services and brokerage call centers that operate in Eastern Europe. So I think it would cause some testing of the law, if it were to go into effect, about what that means.

[15:10] Jesse: Yeah, that's interesting. Many people have part of their operation overseas, but I guess it would depend a little bit on where it's based. What is your perspective on the impact that Montgomery is ultimately going to have on both the carrier market and the brokerage market?

[15:34] Ken: I don't think much on carriers at a macro level. The reason I love freight is that everything has a micro and a macro component. I think there will still be more than enough capacity at any given time. That's just the dynamics of the market and the way it's priced. Over any macro period of time there'll be enough trucks to haul the freight we need. I don't think any of us will have to travel distances on the Oregon Trail to find the things we need as a result of one court case. But I think it's going to make it a lot harder for small trucking companies, and especially new trucking companies. If we're basically marching toward a standard where you have to be a 12-month-old authority to get any freight without a broker risking a nuclear verdict or a thermonuclear verdict, and we know the industry turns over at roughly 80 to 120% per year, theoretically, in less than a few years you'd have no trucks left, because everyone becomes new.

[16:41] Jesse: Why do you think twelve months? Is that just generally seen to be the reasonable standard, like you don't have enough operating history to make a judgment without that?

[16:56] Ken: Yeah. We haul a lot of auto freight. We haul a lot of high-requirement produce freight for retailers. So our driver requirements were already very high. In most cases we're aiming for a driver that's been in for eighteen to twenty-four months of service to haul that type of stuff. We have a hard floor of a year. If you think about the practicality of that, we didn't change our standard, but our standard became a lot more competitive. We actually weren't facing stiff competition for those carriers, because no one wanted to pay for them. But now that everyone has to, you start to see people fishing in our pond more. So on the carrier side, I think it's going to be a little bit of rough and tumble for the small guys. If you're on a conditional rating, I don't know how you're hauling anything right now. There are a couple folks I interact with on social, and it's borderline tragic. They've been in business forever. The FMCSA is not overly responsive. They get a conditional rating for something that could be minor. Before, brokers would give you a documented path to work with them, because maybe you'd hauled 100 loads for them in the past and they knew you and they knew you were working on getting a reinspection to clear that up. Now, the Montgomery decision involved a conditional carrier that Robinson, the courts basically said, should never have used. And a big percentage of carriers have no rating at all, positive or negative. So carrier selection remains tough. It'll be great for the carrier vetting companies. I think it'll be the heyday for them. Could you imagine a world where you have a tragic accident and you're standing there and they say, well, did you look that carrier up in Highway? No, we don't buy Highway. That's bad. So it puts an onus on documentation, and then I think the insurance thing will play itself out. That's not my forte, but I don't think it's going to be an apocalyptic event for brokers. I just think it's going to put a lot more pressure on the small guys, for sure.

[18:57] Jesse: Yeah. It is interesting, because you could see a world where you get a de facto return to a limited set of carriers that can actually operate, because they're the only ones that can earn business. So you would get some consolidation, because somebody who's running well would be able to expand their fleet to meet the exiting capacity of the small guys who can't operate. If that plays out, you'd expect the average fleet size to start to increase. Do you think there's a point where that starts to shift even the brokerage role, in a world with more consolidated carriers? Or do you think it's not likely to go that far, and the core value prop of understanding and managing a long network of smaller carriers stays valuable?

[19:57] Ken: That's a loaded question. If you look at the insurance requirements, the folks that stand to win the most here are the asset-light brokerages that dangle off of a big carrier, like a Werner, as an example. Werner as a combined entity has the right structure, because the asset fleets have to carry a lot more insurance than a broker, whether you break it down on a per mile basis or however you want to think about it. Some of the early reads coming out of the top insurance folks in the industry were that brokers would have to carry the same amount of insurance as an asset-based carrier, which would be devastating to the P&L of a broker, because the construction of the P&L is not in any way similar. But then you have these fleets, whether it's a shipper that has a private fleet that's also operating a brokerage, or a large asset-based carrier, or in our case, we have a trucking company in our portfolio. It services expedite. We have a warehouse. I think the ones that are going to win are going to have insurance and organizational structures that make them more durable and more aware of the risks that could face them as a liability component. Because if you're operating a trucking company in addition to a brokerage, you've been carrying that risk. This isn't new to you. So they're well equipped to handle it. I do think the big carriers win in this pretty tremendously.

[21:22] Jesse: Say more there. I think I'm following the logic, but tell me more about why the big carriers with brokerages will win.

[21:32] Ken: One, I think they're able to carry the insurance that would protect them from an out-of-business kind of event.

[21:36] Jesse: Right, because extending that coverage, they're already wearing a lot of it.

[21:41] Ken: Right. They're wearing a lot of it already. They're probably already carrying far more insurance even under their brokerage than a typical non-asset brokerage would be carrying. I think they win on the trucking side because they're able to comply, and no one's going to look at Schneider, the trucking company, and say, hmm, I wonder if they're a safe carrier. Could you imagine standing in a court and they're like, why did you hire Schneider? Well, go outside. Within 10 minutes you're going to see 20 orange boxes driving down the road. Everyone hires Schneider. But if someone says, why did you hire Jesse Trucking? They've only been in business for two months, they've already had two non-fatal accidents, and this is their third accident and it's now fatal. Why did you hire them? I wouldn't want 12 people, as a business owner, weighing the circumstances of that. So I just think all of these things move toward bigger business. Everything this administration has largely done has pushed toward bigger brokerages being more successful, whether it was intentional or not. Because a small brokerage can't subscribe to DAT, Truckstop, Highway, Sonar. They're going to pick and choose. Maybe they don't buy the tool that tells them that carrier had some problems because they couldn't afford it. Or they just don't have the bandwidth. It's a five-person shop, someone didn't happen to look that carrier up on the vetting system that day, made a bad decision, and then boom, out of business.

[23:09] Jesse: Yeah, super interesting. Ken, one of the things you said earlier was that coming out of your prior role into this one, there's a lot that you've learned you were right about, and things you were maybe wrong about. I'm curious about your reflections. How does your role feel different right now, and what are the things you've changed your mind on, or the shifts in perspective in the new role?

[23:50] Ken: I'm glad that I was correct that data is very much king, regardless of broker size. When I left the business, it felt like you were pricing into a void, and you were getting this intermittent signal back. It would help you optimize what you were doing, but there wasn't enough there to construct what the market was doing, if that makes any sense. You could see where DAT was reporting the market heading, or where maybe ACT or Cass was telling you where the market was going, and that was good. You could see what you were doing relative to what they were saying, and you'd say, I feel good about this, I'm hitting my numbers or I'm not, so let's do this. Fast forward, I go to DAT, and the last seven years have been all about arming people with more tools, more transparency, the advent of APIs and bot pricing. So we're here now, and I don't know who they are, I can suspect who they are in some cases, but I can see what everyone else is doing. We can make small changes to our pricing algorithms and see instantaneous feedback in more wins, more losses. We can oversubscribe in a market and get our backs against the wall, and then think, wow, that happened because someone else let off. Let's say a shipper has 10 loads a day coming out of Fontana, California, going to Sparks, Nevada, as an example. Maybe we were happy winning two or three of those and covering them at a margin we were happy with. Then say we didn't even make a change, but we wake up the next day and we have seven or eight or nine or ten of those. And we're like, what happened? The other broker or the other carrier saw a market change before we did and adjusted, and we got stuck holding the bag. In my experience, and I wasn't at a small brokerage, it was a big several-hundred-million-dollar brokerage, that never happened. Or if it did, we were unaware of it, and we reported on it a month later. So that has been fun to see.

[25:44] Jesse: So you're seeing that, and you think that's partly because now that this API infrastructure is in place, the feedback is much more real time. Somebody else has caught something or made adjustments to their bidding strategy.

[26:00] Ken: Yeah. And again, I'm wrong, God, I can't even tell you, probably ten times already today. The thing I didn't appreciate: I was talking to a senior person at one of the freight tech companies this week. Everyone loves to go visit customers, you spend a day or two, you get a nice dinner and have a couple cocktails, and you think, wow, I understand the customer problem. It would be awesome to take a one-month sabbatical. If I could have done that at DAT, I would have come back and been hell on wheels for three years. I would have probably got more in that month. It's not that I was wrong. It's the gaps that I didn't know existed, and what we could have done to fill those, that you can only really experience when you're living with that pain day to day. I'll give you a very specific example. If you price a lane drop trailer, we all know this intuitively, and I've stood on a stage and said it, and academically it all makes sense to me. But what tools out there today help you truly understand the difference in market dynamics between drop and live load, and how you think about it on an RFP versus a spot opportunity? You're kind of on your own. And all of those things, like how to respond. In the example I gave you about that lane, the ninth load that day is gonna price a lot different than the first. But if you run DAT RateView or Sonar or anything, it's gonna give you the same answer all ten times.

[27:22] Jesse: Yeah, it's super interesting, because I've often thought about this in terms of your marginal cost to cover the load being very different. The first one or two versus the ninth are going to have wildly different margin profiles. But there's this competitive dimension to it as well. In a scenario where somebody got ahead of you and left you holding the bag, what is it that you think they're learning faster? What does that say to you about what you need to do differently, or how do you try to remedy that?

[28:17] Ken: This is what I love about this industry, because very rarely will you have someone come on a podcast and share how they're looking at this for the benefit of everybody. But we all talk about this in a very non-antitrust, non-collusive way. We all want to kill each other and win, but we also all want to do our jobs better. This core group, maybe the top forty or fifty, are very interested in the science of this and how it plays out. Brokerage winning, capital B, is great for all of us. If shippers have a really bad experience, and the spot experience through APIs is a bunch of brokers winning a bunch of stuff erroneously and having to give it back, that's a horrible experience, and they're going to turn that off. If their experience is, wow, I can put this out to a portal hands free and get a great price and a great experience, that's good for capital B brokerage. So I'll preface it with that. I think the best in the industry are looking at a triangle: conversion, margin, and how accurately you're pricing. The example I've been giving a lot recently is the Friday before the Fourth of July. It was brutal. We were all run ragged. I called it a marathon that we ran like a sprint. Came in Monday and there was no freight. We weren't winning anything. Our conversion rate legitimately went down over fifty percent. I posted about this pretty publicly. We had to grab the sticks at eleven or twelve o'clock and say, this is an us problem, and quickly fine-tune things. So, to specifically answer your question, we saw conversion go down, margin go up, and model accuracy drift to overshooting the market. We were pricing too high, not winning enough, and what we were winning was profitable, but it wasn't enough. We still weren't getting the gross margin falling through that funnel. I think a lot of folks made that adjustment and then went to sleep a little bit for the rest of that week or the week after. We kept chasing it down, which again I was pretty public about sharing. And I think we benefited. We had seven days in a row that broke all of our spot records. And we could tell total opportunity volume wasn't necessarily up. Total opportunity was actually coming down a little from the sugar rush of the Fourth, especially America 250. On one of those days, on one tranche of bots, we won one in every four spot quotes and hit our margin target.

[30:42] Jesse: Wow. And that's because you were adjusting with the market faster than others, so your win rate was there, but you could legitimately cover that load. You were just faster to adjust for the market condition.

[30:56] Ken: Yeah, and I think it's also how much risk you take. One of my favorite phrases, which I get a lot of flak for, is you can't price like a coward in this industry. It takes a level of conviction in what you're doing. It takes a level of belief in your operations team to go make it so. But you can't be stubborn either, because continuing to beat your head against the wall, that's not being brave and risk-taking. That's just being foolish. You also have to be willing to do price exploration. It is much, much easier to find an optimal price point by starting low and working high than by starting high and working low. The shape of the price curve in our industry leans left. All of these loads are bunched up, because you can't price negative. I guess you theoretically could, but all of these loads bunch up between zero and call it two bucks a mile, and then you have this long tail that goes up to seven or eight. So if you start high, you could be losing, losing, losing, losing. It could take you hours or days or months to get on the fish. But if you start low, you might take a couple heaters out of the gate, but then you're dialed. That's always how I've believed this needs to work.

[32:05] Jesse: Right, because if you're pricing too high, you'll never really win anything, so you're better off starting aggressive and slowly dialing it up until you figure out, okay, this is the line, we can move this stuff and make the margin we need.

[32:22] Ken: Think about it. Our business is unique because we don't know our cost when we sell. That makes it so fun and so challenging. A no signal is awesome. It's a great input into everything we do. But a no signal is so much less rich than a yes signal. Because I never know what it would have cost to move that load when I get a no. When I get a yes, I know what they were willing to pay and what I had to buy for. So I'd rather shade a little bit low and adjust high than start high and move low. And understand, if you're a big broker, and I would consider us an enterprise-size broker, all of these rating tools exist to get you in the zone faster. But that's not going to tell you the answer. Truckstop is not going to tell you the answer. Sonar's not going to tell you the answer when you're in the zone. We operate a single-digit percent margin business. We all do. At the end of the day, when everything's paid for, we're lucky to make three to five percent of what we grossed. And I'm telling you, the zone these companies get you in is way wider than three to five percent in most cases. So there's a lot of science, a lot of experience, a lot of risk, and a lot of learning that happens to get you in a zone where you're one to two percent sure of where you're going to land.

[33:38] Jesse: Yeah, that's really interesting. We talk about pricing capacity as an ML modeling problem, but there are differences in execution. Carrier teams can work harder, make more calls. It's a prediction, but a lot of it comes down to execution as well, and maybe that gets factored into your models, because you develop a sense for how teams execute. How do you think about that dimension, that a lot of this is execution on the carrier side?

[34:17] Ken: I said it's conversion, margin, and model accuracy. Within model accuracy there are two big buckets: your pricing accuracy and your operational efficiency. On pricing accuracy, I can build a pricing model today that's a hundred percent accurate. I'll just add five thousand dollars to every DAT average and we'll cover every single shipment. We'll lose millions of dollars, but I guarantee the model will be a hundred percent accurate. So at a certain point you are predicting what you're going to cover it for, but you want what you're going to cover it for to be a market-appropriate price. It's this dance, and this is where market benchmarks like DAT, like Sonar, like OTR, are incredibly powerful, because they're a static thing you can measure yourself against. Every Monday, DAT sends me a report. I love it. It says, here's how every load you submitted to us was bought against market. They do all the hard work for me. Last week, depending on what market you were looking at, let's say I bought 3% above DAT. That tells me I probably need to benchmark my pricing model with a 3% positive bias, and as long as I'm accurate to within plus or minus of that number, I'm doing pretty good. That's extremely oversimplified. But we need to price both in. One of the most successful things we did, and I'm sharing a little bit of a secret, was to say not all same-day pickups are the same. A same-day pickup you get at eleven in the morning is a heck of a lot different than a same-day pickup you get at three o'clock in the afternoon. That has nothing to do with the market price. It has to do with the reality of the calendar: people are cycling out of their shifts and wrapping up for the day. Those are the things you can help the sales team with by modeling, because they eventually do reflect in the market cost. So it's a blend of both. We're lucky to have great ops. The single biggest problem I faced coming here is that we operate too well. That sounds ridiculous. But at the end of the day, what does a not-great commodity broker do? When they take a heater, they just give it back.

[36:20] Jesse: Right. Yeah.

[36:21] Ken: That's what it comes down to. On the brokerage side, we all end up rejecting tenders. Sometimes there's just no truck or there's nothing you can do. It happens. We hate it. You work with your shippers to minimize it. But a lot of these folks say, I'm not going to take a loss on this, I'm just going to turn it back.

[36:35] Jesse: Right. One of the things I think about sometimes is what you're optimizing for. What is the metric you care about, specifically margin dollars or margin percent? Walmart's core insight was that a lot of retailers would optimize for margin percentage on the products they sold, but their insight was that the fixed cost is the real estate footprint, so they optimized for margin dollars per square foot of retail footprint, and their margins end up looking really good and they're more profitable overall. Especially when you're talking about enterprise shippers and finding that cost curve, how do you think about the balance between those two metrics and what your models are solving for?

[37:46] Ken: I think it's a consistent answer, maybe not on a daily basis, that's a little bit of hyperbole. But when you sit down and build your plan, there are three parts. This will probably get snipped on the internet, but I love triangles. There are three parts of a brokerage: sales, ops, and, I believe, pricing. I think the ones that think of it as just sales and ops haven't evolved to thinking about pricing as a core function yet. Sales' job is to get me the most opportunities, good-quality opportunities. They're in charge of the top-of-funnel opportunity set. Pricing's job is to turn the highest percentage of those opportunities into secured shipments for the betterment of the business. And operations' job is to take all of those shipments and deliver on all of our customer commitments safely, reliably, and at the closest to benchmark price that we possibly can. I think for any broker of enterprise scale, that shakes out to a gross margin dollars number. I can tell you the thing I look at multiple times a day is where we're pacing to our monthly gross margin target. The reason I like that is it gives me degrees of freedom. If my margin per load is low, I might get more aggressive in long haul and less aggressive in short haul and tailor that margin per load up. Or I might say, look, right now I'm not getting enough at-bats. I've asked my sales folks, in partnership with our pricing team, to go get more at-bats. Give us more chances, because our conversion rate's not going to be as high, because we can't maybe go as low as the market needs to go right now in terms of gross margin, given some of our buying variability. So there's no set answer. Micro and macro again: as a business, we macro-manage toward gross margin dollars. You could think of that as a percent, because it's always going to be a percentage of revenue. But in the middle of the day, I'm just trying to win the right opportunities, trusting my sales guys and gals to get me more opportunities, and trusting my operators to get the maximum amount of value out of those opportunities.

[39:56] Jesse: Yeah, very interesting. Ken, what are some of the things where your opinion differs from the masses in brokerage?

[40:08] Ken: I think a lot of people are anti algorithmic pricing. I've had the extreme good fortune to watch many brokerages scale throughout the years. I met the guys at Arrive when they were well, well south of a billion, still using DAT's proprietary TMS system. They're all good friends of mine, Matt Pyatt and David Spencer and the crew over there. You get to watch them and help them and partner with them as they hit these awesome milestones. As a freight tech vendor, you want to succeed when your customers are succeeding. But getting to a thousand loads a day is a really, really hard thing to do as a broker. A lot of people believe you should be hand spot quoting everything, because no one's going to know more about that load and that relationship. I'll tell you, there's absolutely no way you're going to hand spot quote as many loads as C.H. Robinson does in a day. It doesn't exist. You would need hundreds of thousands of people, most likely. So this idea that you can be a successful scale brokerage, adopt algorithmic pricing, and still have great relationships appears to be a point of contention. As brokerages scale, maybe they second-guess their belief on that, but some don't need to.

[41:25] Jesse: Why? Because they get burnt?

[41:32] Ken: I think the reason they're against it is that once you take your hands off the sticks, it takes an immense amount of trust. And at a certain point every brokerage has to start hiring people that are totally different from the people they hired to get them to where they are today. If you look at an eighty to a hundred million dollar broker, the people that got them there are gritty, smart, driven operators and salespeople. Making your first analyst or pricing hire can be out of the comfort zone of someone there. And when you walk into a C.H. Robinson, who has an entire floor of the brightest data science and analytics people, Mark Albrecht and Tim Gagnon over there are some of the smartest, most brilliant people in the industry, and they're commanding teams of hundreds that think about this problem every day. That is a pretty big divide. So I understand why that's a difference of opinion. But if you plucked that person up and put them in a scale brokerage that needs to move two hundred million dollars worth of freight that year, they'd probably think a little differently about how they're going to ring the register for that amount of freight.

[42:36] Jesse: Yeah, it's interesting, because you hear this idea that the best individuals can probably price a specific load better than an algorithm. Maybe that's often true. But the challenge is, can you price every load, and is every person your best person? Generally that's not true.

[43:02] Ken: No. Here's what it comes down to. I guarantee if you had absolute knowledge of the universe and you pulled every single load that was quoted by a bot and every single load that was quoted by a person, the person would be orders of magnitude lower on losers, and the bot would be orders of magnitude higher on conversion. And unless you have a really poor pricing strategy and a poor pricing staff, your bot is going to be able to generate more revenue, because there's such risk aversion on the low side when you're pricing as a human that it prohibits you from unlocking the tremendous opportunity that sits on the high side.

[43:39] Jesse: So you might have fewer losers but less margin dollars.

[43:43] Ken: Yeah, way less. I'll be transparent, it's a point we're working on now. This week I spent two whole days with our operations and pricing team working through this. In a lot of brokerages, the conversion rate on bots is three to four times that of what you get on a human, because as humans we're really good at risk conversion on the low side. We're really bad at opportunity capture on the high side. People are tuned psychologically and biologically to be averse to the risk of the negative.

[44:18] Jesse: Yeah, totally. When you think about your pricing models, what is the human involvement today? I've spoken to pricing teams from five, six, seven years ago, and their view was that you could get pretty far with your model, but it did actually matter who was tinkering with it on the top end. Do you have a static opinion on that? What is the role for a pricing analyst, or somebody responsible for running that model, and where do you see that shifting, if at all?

[45:06] Ken: It's two things. You've got your blocking-and-tackling pricing folks that are going to munge through RFPs and get to the point of decision on those, where you then have broader discussions. That's probably a different topic, a different show. On the spot side, the biggest mistake you can make is to think that you know more than your operators and your salespeople. So I think it's insanely important to have a human in the loop. I think it's insanely important to learn through experience the wheat from the chaff on what feedback is important and what isn't, and to check yourself on being stubborn. We get this all the time: highly trained, highly experienced account managers will reach out and say, hey, it's brake check next week, I need you to double the markup on these markets. I'm not going to do that. We can have a discussion about how much tighter it's going to be and how we should layer that in, but not that knee-jerk reaction. It's always going to be a push and a pull, so it's about having a great relationship internally. As for the degree to which you tinker, I want to tinker less. These last three months have been pretty brutal in terms of learning multiple times a day and taking lumps. I want to get to a point where it's a little more stable. But this market's also been wild. I'll give you a great example. An operator might reach out and say, hey, we have this account, my conversion rate's not been great on it. I want to try taking 5% off everything the model says today. Do you support that? Love that. Give me all of that feedback. We had a commodity shipper in the Midwest. We went from winning about one out of 15 to winning six out of 15, and we were still within our profit thresholds. That's awesome. We take that as a ticket, we institutionalize it in the model, and we follow up on it. This is another big topic we probably can't get into too much today, but I'm huge on experimentation in every sense, whether that's within your business or within your products, like A/B testing. Pricing is this wonderful playground for experimentation. We had an experiment that failed at EASE: the data told us that full truckload shipments under 10,000 pounds tend to price generally less than 45,000 pounds, so let's put a little price tweak in. It worked for most of the country, but it turns out that doesn't matter much for reefers. We got burned on a couple dozen loads before we had to roll it back. But I'm glad we tried. And I'm not being elitist. I understand that's much harder to do if you're moving 50 loads a day all by hand. You don't have the luxury of doing something like that, and I don't have the luxury of doing some of what C.H. Robinson can do. But through experimentation and building trust, you avoid the last thing you want, which is your operators saying, these nerds don't know anything about freight, they're just making a model that looks good on paper and I'm stuck having to use it.

[48:11] Jesse: Yeah, it's interesting. Whenever I've sat next to reps responsible for working with the pricing teams on big accounts where the margins are super thin, I was blown away by the depth of their understanding of every load, how loads tended at specific times of the day, and the adjustments they made. That was a lot of accumulated wisdom, after getting smoked for a long time. It's hard to do, but there are real advantages that come with really dialing those things in.

[48:55] Ken: Craig pointed me to an interview one of the founders of Uber did, which is basically about how everything is price. Everything in logistics is price related. That sounds biased coming from a lifelong pricing nerd. The reason I love pricing is the intersection of traditional science, statistics and analysis, and human behavior. But think about it: the reason ten years ago you were so willing to get into a car with a stranger in metro Detroit after a concert wasn't so much the branding or the technology. It was that it was 90% cheaper and it was there, and you'd have to wait two hours for a cab. Uber slowly was able to raise that price, to where now in most markets, if you look at the data, they're more expensive than your average cab company. In brokerage, relationships are incredibly important. There's no doubt about that. Operational excellence is incredibly important. But at the point of sale, on both the buy and the sell side, there's a lot of friction that can be taken out of your business if you're doing both of those things most effectively. The thing I talk about with the operators is how much easier your job would be with $100 more in every single load. How much easier would it be on sales if I could move that load for that shipper for $100 cheaper? How many more would you win? And if I could do that without it coming out of margin or profitability, I feel like we're creating a flywheel that's much more virtuous than simply trying to do the same thing over and over again.

[50:31] Jesse: Yeah. And the levers for that are buying better and reducing your operating costs so there's more buffer.

[50:38] Ken: Yeah. We have a metric, shipments per employee per day. It's something we track at the core of what we do. We've grown this year, I don't want to quote the exact numbers because they're private, but on the order of tens of thousands of shipments a year, and we've reduced headcount by 50 folks. We operate our size of business with under 200 people. If I'd told you five years ago, doing market benchmarking, it was about a million bucks per person at a brokerage, give or take. Robinson, prior to some of this litigation stuff, the reason they were on such a tear was that they were deploying technology to reduce headcount. That's the space you're in. If you can make the brokerage more efficient, you can start to share some of that with the market, so to speak, and become more efficient in your buy and sell operations.

[51:23] Jesse: Yeah. It's almost mathematically true that from a shipper's perspective, especially for enterprise accounts with a lot of freight to move, the market clearing price is often set by whoever can operate at scale with the lowest cost profile, because they can make the same margin dollars but sell at a lower price point. That's the feedback loop. For some types of freight, I do think there will be a compounding benefit to investing in being able to execute and buy better, giving that back in lower prices to shippers, which lets you gain share, which lets you operate at a lower cost per load and buy better.

[52:16] Ken: I agree with that a hundred percent. The reason I'm careful to use the word share is that a lot of brokerages have gotten into a lot of trouble by saying, I'm going to price off my variable cost, undercut everyone, and gain all this share. And eventually you've got to pay the piper. When you're doing these things thoughtfully, and you say, okay, I'm operating five percent more efficiently, so maybe I can get one or two percent more efficient on my sell, which will get me more freight, that starts to build things.

[52:41] Jesse: Yeah, exactly. It allows you to grow volume, and then there are other benefits. Your amortized cost per load is lower, and maybe you have better buying power in lanes.

[52:58] Ken: Yeah. It's hard not to be stubborn in some of this, because you have to shift gears. There are days when the data's telling us that pricing's going to be really inelastic today, we can take our model up globally three to five percent, we're not going to see a dip in conversion, and we should just not be stubborn and do that, even if we're in growth mode that particular period. I want that extra margin when I can go get it. Being able to challenge yourself, think more holistically, and take risks in both directions gives you a lot of money in the bank. It gives you a lot more grace when things move the other way and you have to grin and bear it. Because when a big broker, one far bigger than us, decides they want volume, they have a lot more latitude to go buy share than even we would. And we certainly have more ability to do that than a small, small broker would.

[53:48] Jesse: Yeah. Ken, one question I'm interested in: we've spoken a lot about the benefits of scale in serving some of these accounts. I've spoken with procurement managers at enterprise shippers about this, and their experience was that they often had a number of smaller brokerages in their portfolio that did a really good job, even relative to the big guys. They just knew how to service the account really well and knew how to buy. It had me thinking, is there another mode here? When you think about cost per load, a lot of it is raw operating efficiency, but sometimes the way you get your cost per load down is by having a really deep understanding of that customer, so you're not screwing things up all the time. And you've spent the time building out a good carrier network for that shipper, so it's not really algorithmic pricing, it's that you've built up density, and there's a path to compete on that level as a smaller, more boutique brokerage. What do you think about that?

[55:20] Ken: I wouldn't want to have to do that, especially at our size, on the spot market. I think that is the way with primary awards. I'll share even less about that, because I think we have some unique perspectives there that I don't necessarily want other folks to have. But it's a classic approach. You bite off a little more than you can chew, you take it on the chin for a couple quarters, you learn the lanes, you learn the carrier mix, you get some quasi-dedicated repeat carriers, and you win over time. There is no better position to be in as a broker than an incumbent at an RFP. And there's probably no worse position to be as a non-incumbent at an RFP. The win rates are completely and totally polar opposite from each other. So I do agree with that. There are brokers that exist and are super successful based on one account. There are poultry brokers out there that only exist to service a Tyson or a Perdue. They've figured out something no one else can do, they do it extremely well, and they probably do it at a cost no one can touch. For us, it's about being thoughtful. When I go into an RFP, it's, well, how bad are those first couple of months going to be, especially if it's a big volume award? And where do I feel like it'll asymptote out over three or six months, so I can get into the groove? But then you're always going to have fall-offs. All the best-laid plans in our business go awry.

[56:48] Jesse: Yeah. Ken, final question. What are you excited about over the next twelve months, for you, for EASE, for the industry?

[57:00] Ken: I think next year's going to be a great year for brokers. For us, it's getting a strong finish to the year. I'm excited to work with new partners and new vendors. We've got a lot of really awesome things cooking. It is an absolute delight to play with all the fun stuff I couldn't play with while I was at DAT for the last seven years. It's a blessing and a curse, because there's so much that your eyes get wide. It's an all-you-can-eat buffet at times. And growing our team here. Leadership is a big part of why I do this. I've had a chance to hire some folks already, and we're going to keep building our team. I'm excited about where the next twelve to eighteen months point us. And I just love the competitive dopamine hits of doing this. There's really nothing else like it. As long as that continues, I'll be a happy person.

[57:53] Jesse: Cool. Ken, thanks so much for the conversation. I really enjoyed it.

[57:57] Ken: Thank you.